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Abstract 
Background: To strengthen health systems, the shortage of physicians globally needs to be addressed. However, 
efforts to increase the numbers of physicians must be balanced with controls on medical education imparted and the 
professionalism of doctors licensed to practise medicine.
Methods: We conducted a multi‑country comparison of mandatory regulations and voluntary guidelines to control 
standards for medical education, clinical training, licensing and re‑licensing of doctors. We purposively selected seven 
case‑study countries with differing health systems and income levels: Canada, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, UK and USA. 
Using an analytical framework to assess regulations at four sequential stages of the medical education to relicens‑
ing pathway, we extracted information from: systematically collected scientific and grey literature and online news 
articles, websites of regulatory bodies in study countries, and standardised input from researchers and medical profes‑
sionals familiar with rules in the study countries.
Results: The strictest controls we identified to reduce variations in medical training, licensing and re‑licensing of 
doctors between different medical colleges, and across different regions within a country, include: medical educa‑
tion delivery restricted to public sector institutions; uniform, national examinations for medical college admission and 
licensing; and standardised national requirements for relicensing linked to demonstration of competence. However, 
countries analysed used different combinations of controls, balancing the strictness of controls across the four stages.
Conclusions: While there is no gold standard model for medical education and practise regulation, examining the 
combinations of controls used in different countries enables identification of innovations and regulatory approaches 
to address specific contextual challenges, such as decentralisation of regulations to sub‑national bodies or privatisa‑
tion of medical education. Looking at the full continuum from medical education to licensing is valuable to under‑
stand how countries balance the strictness of controls at different stages. Further research is needed to understand 
how regulating authorities, policy‑makers and medical associations can find the right balance of standardisation and 
context‑based flexibility to produce well‑rounded physicians.
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Introduction
Addressing the shortage of healthcare providers—which 
is essential for improving health worldwide—poses a 
conundrum for health policy-makers. There is an urgent 
need to train more healthcare providers to address the 
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estimated needs-based shortfall of 17.4 million glob-
ally [1]. At the same time, there is a growing body of lit-
erature raising concerns about insufficient attention to 
minimum standards of professional education and licens-
ing, and the professionalism of healthcare providers as 
a result [2–5]. Whilst the number of medical doctors in 
the health workforce is growing globally by more than 
400,000 every year, variation in the level of professional-
ism—which includes technical competence, clinical skills 
and ethical conduct—is huge [3, 4, 6]. Serious systemic 
issues underlying this variation are illustrated by reports 
of the explosive growth of for-profit medical colleges 
with low teaching and examination standards, imperson-
ation fraud used in medical college entrance exams, and 
bribery as a route into some medical colleges [7–12].
In this paper, we focus on regulation across the full 
professional development continuum from medical edu-
cation and clinical training, to physician licensing and 
re-licensing. We examine the types of controls in place 
to ensure a minimum standard of professionalism among 
licensed doctors, recognising that controls along this 
continuum may influence the ultimate quality of care that 
they provide [13]. There is clear evidence that insufficient 
control on standards of medical education, training and 
licensing warrants attention as it allows large variations 
in class sizes, examination procedures, core curricula 
and basic clinical competence within the same country 
[14–17]. Yet there is a gap in the literature, particularly 
with respect to studies that consider the intersection of 
medical education and workforce regulation policy [13, 
18]; most studies look at specific processes in isolation, 
such as licensing or continuing medical education (CME) 
[19, 20], rather than the combination of controls applied 
across the professional development continuum.
Analytical framework and objectives
We developed the analytical framework presented in 
Fig.  1 to guide our analysis. It outlines four stages—
from admission in medical college to licensing and 
re-licensing—at which regulatory controls can act. It 
also emphasises that contextual factors can influence 
the type of regulatory approach. The framework was 
designed based on a review of seminal literature on the 
quality of medical care and medical education [4, 5, 21, 
Fig. 1 Analytical framework
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22], and the division of medical education components 
proposed by Zhu et al. [23]. The four stages reflect fac-
tors affecting the quality of the health workforce as 
described by Burdick and Dhillon [13], including who is 
chosen to enter the profession (Stage 1), how and what 
they are taught (Stage 2), how they are determined to 
be qualified (Stages 2 and 3), and how they maintain 
and update their skills (Stage 4).
Since terminology varies across countries, we refer to 
medical degree administering institutions as ‘medical 
colleges’ and to the period of clinical training between 
graduation from medical college and licensing as ‘clinical 
training’.
The literature indicates that there is a multiplicity of 
regulatory tools and approaches available at each of the 
four stages, depending on the country and/or regional 
context. Studies of regulatory regimes repeatedly refer to 
a mix of approaches, with little consistency across differ-
ent country contexts [19, 24, 25], and there is no agree-
ment on which regulatory approaches might be most 
effective in ensuring professionalism. Indeed, no model 
emerges as ‘gold standard’ for regulation that is applica-
ble across diverse contexts [19, 25]. For instance, there 
is no ideal approach to determining the frequency of 
re-licensing (stage 4 on our framework) and the modali-
ties and frequency of CME. The most commonly used 
standards, from the World Federation of Medical Educa-
tion, cover basic medical education, post-graduate medi-
cal education and continuing professional development 
[26]. The standards do not cover licensing, nor are they 
prescriptive. As stated by the World Federation of Medi-
cal Education, their standards are intended to provide a 
framework for educational institutions and accrediting 
agencies to develop and evaluate medical education as 
appropriate for the context [27].
In light of the lack of research looking at the entire con-
tinuum from medical education and training to licens-
ing and re-licensing, and comparing approaches used 
across diverse contexts, our study examines how differ-
ent national and sub-national agencies apply the various 
available regulatory controls to different stages in this 
continuum. We discuss possible implications of different 
regulatory approaches applied and seek to identify inno-
vations in models of regulation that could be useful to 
learn from.
Methods
In line with our analytical framework, we purposively 
selected seven countries from North America, Europe 
and Asia. We limited our scope to geographical regions 
where the research team had expertise and connections 
owing to the need for extensive validation of information 
by local experts. Within these regions, we selected coun-
tries that differed on key attributes that could underpin 
variations in the types and quality of regulations. These 
attributes included: (i) gross national income (as clas-
sified by the World Bank) [28]; (ii) whether regulations 
relating to medical education and licensing were con-
trolled by national or sub-national authorities; and (iii) 
extent of private sector presence in medical education 
(Table 1).
Focusing on regulations and guidelines that relate to 
the four stages in our analytical framework within each 
country, we collected information from three sources: 
websites of relevant regulating bodies in each country 
(such as national medical councils), a systematic search 
for scientific and grey literature and news articles pub-
lished online, and written input from 1–2 medically 
qualified researchers or medical professionals with lived 
experience and knowledge of each of following countries: 
Table 1 Overview of case‑study countries [74, 75]
Indicator Country
Canada China India Iran Pakistan UK USA
World Bank income classifica‑
tion
High Upper middle Lower middle Upper middle Lower middle High High
Population size (2019) 38 million 1.4 billion 1.3 billion 83 million 217 million 67 million 328 million
General government 
expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total govern‑
ment expenditure (2018)
20% 9% 3% 22% 5% 19% 23%
Physicians per 1000 popula‑
tion (2018/19)
2.8 2.0 0.8 1.6 1.0 3.0 2.6
Regulation of medical educa‑
tion and licencing led by 
national authorities or sub‑
national authorities?
Sub‑national Sub‑national Sub‑national National Licencing by national body; 
medical education by sub‑
national
National Sub‑national
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China, India, Iran, and Pakistan. For the latter, we used 
standardised questions that solicited information about 
each of the stages in our analytical framework. Our sys-
tematic search methodology is summarised in the appen-
dix (Appendix 1). Information from these three sources 
was analysed by following three steps. First, we extracted 
relevant information about each country using an MS 
Excel-based template with sections mirroring our ana-
lytical framework. Second, we examined the standardised 
information collected about processes and regulations in 
each study country individually, from stages one to four 
in the framework. Third, we summarised the information 
at key steps into either yes/no answers for the presence of 
a regulation, or into years (of study), to allow cross-coun-
try comparisons.
Results
Table  2 presents a summary of our comparative analy-
sis, and below we synthesise the key findings using sub-
headings that correspond to the stages in our analytical 
framework. Some overarching differences are summa-
rised here.
First, we identify large variation in the (usual) num-
ber of years of education between completing secondary 
schooling and being licensed to practise medicine rang-
ing from five and a half years in India to 11 years in the 
USA. Part of this difference relates to the usual require-
ment in the USA and Canada to complete a 3 to 4-year 
undergraduate degree before entering into medical col-
lege. Additional training for specialisation varies accord-
ing to the field and is outside the scope of our analysis. 
Apart from the UK and Canada, all other countries we 
analysed allow medical education to be delivered by both 
public and private medical colleges, although the domi-
nance of private medical education and approaches used 
to regulate private medical education vary. In Iran, pri-
vate medical education is typically nested within some of 
the highest ranking and well-resourced public universi-
ties, where students who can afford the fees can receive 
medical education despite having lower examination 
scores [29]. These medical colleges also offer education 
to overseas students, comprised of an initial compo-
nent in English for the first two to three years, followed 
by clinical training in Farsi alongside the rest of medical 
students. In both Pakistan and India, there are now sub-
stantially more private than public medical colleges [30, 
31], and the medical education and licensing regulators 
are currently undergoing reforms, after decades. India 
has introduced the 2019 National Medical Commission 
(NMC) Bill, which is in the process of implementation, 
and in Pakistan, a new regulating authority—the Pakistan 
Medical Commission (PMC) (has been established [32, 
33].
Stage 1: medical college admission
For the countries we analysed, standards for entry into 
medical education are regulated in three ways: through 
identical entrance tests to all public and private medi-
cal colleges administered by external agencies (USA, 
UK, and Canada) (Box  1); through standardised tests 
which are not specific to medical colleges but are used 
by all undergraduate colleges across the country as part 
Table 2 Comparison of regulations for medical education, clinical training, licensing and re‑licensing across the four stages of the 
analytical framework and across the case‑study countries
a Introduced in 2021 (Pakistan) and 2022 (India)
b Physicians have to pass a competency test every two years to continue to practise even though licence renewal is not required
c Only applies to nine states that have mandatory relicensing
Stage Regulations Can China India Iran Pak UK USA
N/A Are private (for‑profit) medical colleges allowed? No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
1 Is there a uniform examination that all students undertake for admission to medical col‑
lege?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Is there a uniform examination for acquiring a medical degree? Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes
2 Is medical training offered at the undergraduate level/ without first degree? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
2,3 Total years of medical education and clinical training (after school) to be eligible for medi‑
cal licence
9–10 8 5.5 7 6 7 11
3 Is there a national licensing exam? Yes Yes Noa No Noa No Yes
4 Is license renewal by an independent body required across the country Yes Nob No Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 After how many years is licensing renewal required, if at all? 1 N/A 5c 5 2 5 1–4
4 Does permission to continue medical practise require CME or demonstration of clinical 
competencies?
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of the admissions decisions, whether public or private 
(China and Iran); and  through admission tests which 
are not standardised across the country and are instead 
determined by the state/province (in the case of public 
colleges) or the medical college itself (in the case of pri-
vate colleges) (in Pakistan and India prior to the ongoing 
reforms).
Even when there are stronger controls, through identi-
cal or standardised tests, it is often the case that the top-
tier medical colleges will only accept students with high 
testing scores, whilst  some private medical colleges will 
accept students with weaker scores. For example, when 
it comes to overseas students, the entry requirements for 
medical colleges in Iran vary depending on the college 
and are typically less rigorous. Similarly, in China, admis-
sion decisions for overseas students are managed by the 
college. Changes to medical college admissions rules are 
highly political. In Pakistan, while a uniform admission 
test is necessary to enter all private and public medical 
colleges from 2021 onwards, there are ongoing disputes 
about whether private colleges are at liberty to decide 
what weighting to give to the entrance exam results in 
admission decisions [34]. To centralise and standard-
ise admissions procedures nationwide, the Indian union 
government introduced the National Eligibility Cum 
Entrance Test for admission into all medical and dental 
programmes in 2012. This was ruled unconstitutional 
from 2013 to 2016 and is now reinstated as the sole 
admission criterion under the NMC Bill 2019 [35].
Box 1: Medical college admissions
Examination specific for students applying to medical 
colleges
Canada—Medical College Admissions Test (except 
Quebec).
India—National Eligibility Entrance Test.
Pakistan—Medical and Dental College Admissions 
Test.
UK—UK Clinical Aptitude Test or BioMedical 
Admissions Test.
USA—Medical College Admissions Test.
Examination for all undergraduate education
China—National College Entrance Examination 
(Gaokao).
Iran—Iranian University Entrance Exam (Konkour).
Stage 2: medical curriculum and examination
The USA, UK, Iran and Canada have standardised medi-
cal education curricula and qualifying examinations for 
receiving a medical degree that are overseen by third-
party governing bodies, enabling relatively strict controls 
over standards for graduating doctors [36–41]. The USA, 
Iran and Canada have multi-part examinations which 
are identical for all students in all medical colleges. In 
Iran, all medical students are required to take uniform, 
standardised examinations twice during medical college: 
basic sciences in the third year and a clinical knowledge 
assessment in the fifth or sixth year. All students addi-
tionally take a clinical competency examination focusing 
on practical skills in their final year prior to receiving the 
diploma. The UK has weaker controls at the examination 
stage; medical examinations are reviewed to meet assess-
ment standards, but vary from college to college [42]. 
However, a new examination for all UK medical colleges, 
the Medical Licensing Assessment, will begin in 2024 
[43].
In China, the curricula covered and teaching mate-
rials used may vary slightly between medical colleges, 
depending on additional teaching materials colleges 
select to complement standardised textbooks, although 
the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health have 
clear guidelines on this [44]. Although qualifying exami-
nations administered by each medical college can differ, 
the National Medical Licensing Examination is the same 
across the country.
In Pakistan, there are guidelines on the minimum con-
tent required in each of the compulsory subjects in medi-
cal colleges, but no enforced regulation. Pakistan has no 
standardised examination to receive a medical degree, 
although a National Licensing Exam has been introduced 
which is planned to be implemented from 2021. Under 
the NMC Bill 2019, India is shifting to a competency 
based undergraduate curriculum that applies to pub-
lic and private medical colleges, and is overseen by the 
newly introduced NMC [45]. It is also introducing a two-
part National Exit Test, which should be in place by 2022, 
and will be a requirement for entry into postgraduate 
training and registration in the state and national regis-
ters [46]. In recent years, however, qualifying examina-
tions have varied across colleges in Pakistan and India, 
such that it can be easier to receive a nationally recog-
nised medical degree from some colleges.
Stage 3: clinical training and licensing
A medical licence permits a person to legally practise 
medicine, and all countries have a method of licens-
ing medical doctors following completion of mandatory 
clinical training. The latter typically involves the graduate 
doctor conducting clinical work under the supervision of 
a licensed clinician.
The USA and China have the longest durations of clini-
cal training (3 years) which must be completed in a gov-
ernment approved facility. Following clinical training in 
the USA, a licence is granted after completing the three-
step licensing exam [3]. China’s standardised residency 
training, which has been mandatory from 2020, is divided 
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into two-and-a-half years of hospital-based training and 
6 months in a community healthcare facility [47]. This is 
followed by an assessment to obtain a certificate of com-
pletion of residency training, which is recognised nation-
wide [48]. Doctors need two certificates to be licensed 
to practise medicine in China. To receive the Medical 
Practitioner’s Qualification Certificate, graduates must 
pass the National Medical Licensing Examination and 
complete postgraduate training. The Physician’s Practice 
License is obtained after joining a specific medical facil-
ity and needs to be re-applied for if the doctor moves to 
another place of work.
The UK and Canada require two years of clinical train-
ing in government-funded and accredited hospitals. 
Proof of completion of two  years of clinical training is 
required for licensing, and further specialty training is 
often undertaken [43, 49].
In Iran, there are some differences depending on 
whether the student intends to practise inside or out-
side of Iran. All students go through 18 months of clini-
cal training (internship) prior to official graduation. In 
their role as interns, they provide essential services at 
the Ministry of Health-affiliated teaching hospitals under 
the supervision of licensed physicians and residents. 
After completing medical college and the clinical train-
ing period, a licence to practise is issued following a paid 
mandatory government service provided to areas with 
a shortage of physicians, mainly rural or low-resource 
areas, taking between 14 to 24  months [50]. Overseas 
students are not required to do the mandatory rural area 
service post-graduation if they intend to practise outside 
of Iran.
Pakistan and India have the shortest clinical training 
periods of 12  months. Such training is mandatory for 
receiving a licence and this must be based in a recognised 
teaching institution. In India, six months are reserved for 
rural or community health facilities [51, 52]. Mechanisms 
to check and enforce minimum standards of supervision 
and clinical training in teaching hospitals, such as accred-
itation or audits by external agencies, are not used uni-
formly yet.
Stage 4: re‑licensing
Rules on medical licence renewal and CME across the 
seven countries can be broadly categorised as: manda-
tory licence renewal tied to CME or demonstration of 
some competencies (most states in USA, Canada, UK, 
and Iran), licence renewal mandatory but only requires 
payment of a fee under the PMDC rules (Pakistan) and 
no requirement for licence renewal by an independ-
ent body (China and majority of states in India) [40, 53, 
54]. Although there is no expiration date for the Medi-
cal Practitioner’s qualification certificate in China, CME 
is compulsory, as is passing a performance assessment 
supervised by the local health departments every 2 years; 
doctors who fail are suspended from practising for 
3–6 months until they pass the assessment [55]. There are 
also assessments conducted by government health facili-
ties, which means that CME is tied to the doctors’ career 
progression, but variation in assessment standards is pos-
sible [20]. Whilst CME completion for doctors working 
in government health facilities is high, the enforcement 
of CME regulations and performance assessments on the 
relatively small proportion of doctors working solely in 
private clinics is not clear [47].
In the USA, whilst all states require re-licensing, the 
specific requirements for renewal varies by state. Only 
one state (Montana) has no CME requirement for medi-
cal doctors to maintain their medical licences [56, 57]. 
Although the Medical Council of India made a man-
datory resolution in 2011 requiring doctors to attend 
minimum of 30 h of CME every five years to ensure re-
registration, only nine of 26 State Medical Councils have 
made re-registration for licence renewal mandatory [58]; 
therefore only about 20% of India’s doctors follow CME 
rules, as they are not legally required in the states in 
which they work [20, 59]. In Pakistan, registration needs 
to be renewed every two years; licence renewal does not, 
however, require any additional assessments or CME, 
only payment of a fee, but this may change under the new 
PMC [14].
Discussion
Our analysis shows that there are wide variations in the 
controls that are employed by countries to regulate medi-
cal education, clinical training and physician licensing 
and re-licensing, and that there is value in analysing the 
entire continuum, as we do in this study, because strong 
controls at one stage are often balanced with less strict 
controls at other stages. Based on our findings and in 
line with what others have reported, we would propose 
it is not practical or desirable to provide a gold standard 
of regulatory approaches to be applied across different 
contexts, and that the strictest controls may not always 
be appropriate [19, 25, 60]. In addition, conceptualising 
regulatory controls as operating on a continuum—from 
medical college admission to relicensing and continued 
professional development—rather than as discrete con-
trols independent of checks at other stages, opens up a 
broader set of regulatory options and offers more flex-
ibility based on what is required or feasible at differ-
ent stages. For example, if there is a strongly enforced 
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minimum standard for medical school graduates, this 
may reduce the need for an additional nationally stand-
ardised examination at the admission to medical college 
stage.
Indeed, the development of a gold standard for regula-
tion of medical education, clinical training, licensing and 
relicensing risks producing a one-size-fits-all approach 
that is excessively reliant on Western approaches [61]. 
We therefore focused instead on drawing lessons through 
a comparison of models used by different countries, 
highlighting specific considerations about controls that 
can be used at each stage of our analytical framework, 
and discussing how contextual factors might influence 
decisions on appropriate controls to use.
Considering the first stage of our framework, medical 
college admission, we note that although having uniform 
admission examinations across all colleges is a control 
often used to standardise the competencies of admit-
ted candidates, allowing colleges the freedom to select 
candidates without a mandatory minimum score dilutes 
the effect of this attempt at standardisation resulting in 
variable enrolment standards even in countries with uni-
form admission examinations. For example, a study from 
China showed that private medical colleges often require 
lower scores than public colleges [62]. An advantage 
of having uniform examinations linked to a minimum 
score for admission is that it prevents profit-making col-
leges from lowering standards to allow fee-paying stu-
dents without sufficient competence to be admitted. 
A uniform national standard of competence required 
at the graduation and/or licensing stage can also help 
to ensure that variations in admission standards do not 
adversely impact levels of professionalism among practis-
ing doctors. However, there may be value in some medi-
cal schools allowing lower admissions scores in contexts 
where there is large sub-national variation in education 
standards or under-representation of specific groups in 
the medical profession. Less emphasis on examination 
scores in admissions decisions may also reflect a grow-
ing realisation that other skills, such as strong commu-
nication and ability to collaborate, is worth considering 
in addition to academic achievements [63, 64]. Alterna-
tively, minimum admissions standards for medical col-
leges may be an incentive for the providers of primary 
and secondary education in less-developed regions to 
improve the quality of education.
In relation to stages two and three in our framework, 
we found that all three countries (UK, Pakistan and India) 
that do not have uniform licensing examinations are cur-
rently in the processes of introducing these as a tool to 
control variations in standards. In Canada, where phy-
sicians are licensed by provincial authorities to practise 
in their jurisdiction, calls have been made to create a 
national license for physicians to standardise licensing 
across provinces so that it is easier to redistribute phy-
sician workforce and reduce gaps in physician coverage 
[65]. Clinical training in a teaching hospital is manda-
tory prior to licensing in all countries, but the quality of 
this training depends on the training institution within 
which graduate doctors are embedded and the supervi-
sion received; this is difficult to monitor and subject to 
variable levels of controls. For example, there is evidence 
of private medical colleges that are not linked to appro-
priate teaching hospitals and clinical laboratories com-
promising the quality of mandatory clinical training [66]. 
As the number of medical colleges grow in a country, it is 
important to ensure that each one is linked to an appro-
priate teaching hospital where graduates can receive 
high quality clinical training. Regulations on the mini-
mum years that an accredited teaching hospital has been 
running for, and on essential medical departments that 
teaching hospitals must have, may be useful here [67].
With respect to the final re-licensing stage of our 
framework, we found that substantial variations in re-
licensing requirements across a country occurred when 
sub-national rather than national authorities are respon-
sible for setting rules (for example, in India and USA). 
In the USA, the states of Indiana and New York only 
require “opioid prescribing and opioid abuse” training 
as part of their mandatory CME, and Montana does not 
require any CME for re-licensing, but all others do. We 
also found that licensing can be de-linked from CME 
requirements or demonstration of knowledge or skills (in 
Pakistan and Montana state, in the USA). Both of these 
situations make it possible for doctors to legally practise 
for decades after initial licensing, without any check on 
their continuing clinical competence. In another model 
de-linking re-licensing and competence, in China, re-
licensing is not required but physicians need to demon-
strate adequate competency in an exam every two years 
to continue to practise. An unusually lax model exists in 
all except nine states of India [68], where physicians do 
not require any re-licensing by an independent regulator 
to continue to practise after acquiring the initial licence. 
Whether physician competencies can be reliably main-
tained in systems without mandatory assessments to 
allow continued medical practise, and whether controls 
at other points help to maintain professional standards 
is a relevant question. Presence of such highly variable 
approaches to relicensing within sub-national entities of 
the same country, such as in India and the US, highlights 
the fact that there is little evidence on the effectiveness 
of various models in maintaining physician competen-
cies and to guide policy choices. Such divergent models 
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operating in the same country provide an opportunity 
to study their comparative effectiveness and strengths or 
weaknesses as regulatory models to maintain physician 
competence.
Although inadequate controls on the quality of med-
ical education and clinical training is a challenge to 
address in both public and private sector institutions, 
the profit-making business model of private medical 
colleges introduces specific complexities with respect 
to regulation [4]. A comparison across our case-study 
countries was insightful here as we could identify three 
approaches to regulating (private) medical education: 
retaining medical education in the public sector (UK, 
Canada); having uniform minimum entry criteria and 
licensing examinations that apply to public and private 
colleges (China and USA); and an innovative approach 
of embedding private sector colleges within public 
universities (Iran). Pakistan and India are currently 
changing their regulations, aiming to move towards 
the second approach.
While investing in public sector medical education 
and retaining all or most medical education in the 
public sector has many advantages, and can reduce the 
layers of controls needed, private medical education is 
often encouraged because it allows injection of private 
capital into medical education to increase the number 
of doctors without government investment [4, 69]. The 
USA shows that relatively strong controls on medical 
education are possible despite having a large and pow-
erful private medical education sector. In countries 
where regulatory authorities have not strengthened at 
the pace at which the private medical education sec-
tor has grown, however, challenges in regulation can 
occur. In India and Pakistan, private medical colleges 
have mushroomed in the last two decades, but with 
increasingly lax regulations because the rapid private 
medical college expansion has outstripped the capacity 
of regulatory systems. It is important for countries to 
be cognisant of becoming trapped in a cycle in which 
weak regulations on minimum standards for faculty 
and infrastructure, and on profit-making, allows the 
number of highly profitable medical colleges to grow 
rapidly, and potentially enables the powerful private 
sector to engage in lobbying or co-opting the regu-
latory process to weaken regulatory controls [70]. 
Suggested approaches include creation of dedicated 
departments of medical education in private colleges, 
relying on system of accreditation and enhancing the 
capacity and powers of regulatory bodies [15, 71].
Although our comparative analysis of regulations 
and guidelines yielded some important insights, we 
acknowledge limitations of our study scope; for exam-
ple, we do not consider rules relating to foreign medi-
cal graduates or compare teaching methods. Another 
limitation is that we focused on regulations as written 
(de jure), regardless of whether the practice is imple-
mented in reality (de facto). Further study on the 
strength of regulatory bodies in different countries, 
involving primary qualitative research with regulators, 
and on the relationship between regulatory controls 
at various stages of medical education and clinical 
competence assurance of practising doctors would be 
useful.
Conclusions
Doctors typically hold a position of power and are 
trusted by patients because of the uncertainty, infor-
mational asymmetry, and buyer vulnerability that 
characterise medical consultations [72, 73]. The pro-
fessionalism of doctors, and the measures put in place 
by relevant authorities to ensure their professional-
ism, are, therefore, paramount. While there is no gold 
standard model for medical education and practise 
regulation—even among high-income countries that 
are perceived as leaders in this area—examining the 
combinations of controls used in different countries 
enables identification of innovations and of regulatory 
approaches that have been used to address specific con-
textual challenges, such as decentralisation of regula-
tions to sub-national bodies or privatisation of medical 
education. Our study highlights the value in looking 
across the full continuum of professional development 
from who is allowed to enter the medical education, 
what students are taught, how they are determined to 
be qualified to practise medicine and how they must 
maintain and update their skills; using our analytical 
framework to examine the full continuum showed that 
countries may balance having weaker controls at one 
stage with stricter controls at an earlier or later stage. 
Finally, whilst we identified a shift towards introduc-
tion of stronger regulatory controls, such as a national 
licensing examination in countries that do not have 
this yet, we emphasise that further work is needed to 
understand how regulating authorities, policy-makers 
and medical associations can find the right balance 
of standardisation and context-based flexibility, and 
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